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ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION O F
POWERS

Section
1. (Three d e p a r t m e n t s of government.]
Section 1. (Tlirce dcpnrtrnentfi of g o v e r n m e n t . )
The powers of the government of the S t a t e of Utah
shnll he divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: a n j n
Person chnrped with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise
any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted1. __ ~
'«- '
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76-5-301. K i d n a p i n g .
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without authority of law
and against the will of the victim:
(a) Detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or
(b) Detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; or
(c) Holds another in involuntary servitude; or
(d) Detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian.
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 1983
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public'offense and there Is reasonable'doubt a» 1ft
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pairing contracts.]
No bfll of attainder, ex post facto law, or law \r*T
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed"
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S e c l(fc—fPtfwera denied the states.]
[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance,
or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts;
pass any bill of attainder, ^ nf«fc facto jaw ? or law
impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant any
title of nobility.
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of
all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to
the Revision and Control of the Congress.
[3.) No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships
of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreements or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power,
or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger asxjriil not admit of delay.
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AMENDMENT XTV
I
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Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforre any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of lTe, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person .i.hin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws*
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No person shail be ocpiivcir-of life, liberty °'
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Sec. 11. (Court* open — Redress of injuries.!
\ All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. which
shall he administered without denini or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from orosecutm^
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.
»•••
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.l
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
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B U R D E N OF ' P R O O F
P r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e — " c l e 7ncnT*o^~07c~b ; ~ c n * r"—rf rfrr»^i—.
il) A d i i c n a a n t tn a criminal proceeding is prosrimcd to oe innocent ur.cil eacn c i e m e n t of the offense charred aeaxnst him is proved bevond a reasonnhif cnuoT.. In nosence oi" such proof, the defendant
shall be c c a u n t c a .
;_-. '.2) As usee m this part the words "element of the
oiiensc rrjvan:
uni The conduct, a t t e n d a n t circumstances, or
rrr.uit.s of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbicidrn m the definition, of the ofTcrme:
(hi The cuioabie mentai suaus required.
(3i The existence of jurisdiction and v«?nuc are not
elements oi the offense r>u: snaii be established by a
lim
preponderance of tne e v i o e n c e .
7n.i..-ni.

KIDNAPING
76-5-301. Kidnaping.
( D A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without authority of law
and against the will of the victim:
(a) Detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or
(b) Detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; or
(c) Holds another in ^voluntary servitude; or
(d) Detains or r&
- a minor without consent of its paren'
guardian.
(2) Kidnaping is a i my of the second degree. 1983
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76-5-302. Aggravated k i d n a p i n g .
( D A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority
of law and against the will of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains,
or transports the victim with intent:
(a) To hold for ransom or rewara, or as a shield
or hostage, or to compel a third person to engage
in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging
in particular conduct; or
(b) To facilitate the commission, attempted
commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another: or
(d) To interfere wifh t^e pprfnrmpm^P of any
governmental or political function; or
(e) To commit a sexual offense as described in
Part 4 of this chapter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the victims custodial parent,
guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first
degree punishable by a term which is a minimum
mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years
and which may be for life.
1983
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction^ of a
first degree or capital felony;
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Section

1. (Three depot tmctils of government.)

»
Section 1. (Three dcpnrtmcnLi of fjovcrnmcnl.I
The powcrn of the government of Die Stnie of Ulnh
shnll bo divided into three distinct departments, the
I^egislntive, the Executive, mid tho Judicial; and ntt
' person chnrped with the exercise of powcra propgrly
bcionyrinft To one o( these dcpnxtmnnls. ghoil exercise
niiy Junctions Appertaining to cither of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed o' ocf*
mitted.
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.—1 76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping, **j "<C
(1)A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority
— - of law and against the will of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains,
or transports the victim with intent:
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield
or hostage, or to compel a third person to engage
^
in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging
in particular conduct; or
(b) To facilitate the commission, attempted
~~ —
commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another; or
(d) To interfere with the performance of any
_._.._.
governmental or political function; or
(e) To commit a sexual offense as described in
Part 4 of this chapter.
—— •
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent,
^
guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first
degree punishable by a term which is a minimu^
mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15, years
and which may be for life.
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"without an admission of committing the criminal
conduct
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special
S.B. 287
damages, but not general damages, which a person
Passed 3/1/95, (Governor did not sign.)
could recover against the defendant in a civil action
Effective 5/1/95
arising out of the facts or events constituting the
Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 337
defendant's criminal activities and includes the
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed,
Amendments to Sentencing Provisions
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including
earnings and medical expenses.
Sponsor: Lane Beattie
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
AN ACT Relating to the Code of Criminal including insured damages, and payment for
Procedure; Requiring the Court to Consider expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or
Home Confinement As a Condition of transportation.
Probation; Requiring the Department of
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the
Corrections to Establish Procedures and court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as
Standards for Home Confinement and a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant
Electronic Monitoring; Providing
E x e m p t i o n s ; A m e n d i n g S e n t e n c i n g in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a
Provisions On Sexual Offenses Against court may sentence a person adjudged guilty of an
Children and Related Offenses; Amending offense to any one of the following sentences or
Related Provisions On Probation and combination of them:
Parole; and Making Technical Changes.
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically
1953 as follows:
provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
.:
AMENDS:
(e) to life imprisonment;
76-3-201, as last amended by Chapter 13, Laws
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison
of Utah 1994
without parole; or
76-3-406, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws
(g) on or after May 1, 1995, to imprisonment at
of Utah 1994
not less than 5 years and which may be for life for
76-5-301.1, as last amended by Chapter 18, Laws
an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and
of Utah 1984
Sections 76-5-301.1 and 76-5-302; or
76-5-302, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws
1(8)1 (h) to death.
^a*
—
t _pJJMU283
(3) (a) This chapter doeV not deprive a court of
76-5-402.1, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of
authority conferred by law to:
ru(*>
Utah 1983
(i) forfeit property;
>: r-. rn«-;;
76-5-402.3, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of
;s
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
i:~ ; j
Utah 1983
(iii)
suspend
or
cancel
a
license;
.^
76-5-403.1, as last amended by Chapter 156,
(iv) permit removal of a person from offlee;
Laws of Utah 1988
(v) cite for contempt; or
-• r .:. A j , rv T-T«VA
76-5-404.1, as last amended by Chapter 170,
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
.:s -•-. .;.-;.
Laws of Utah 1989
TS.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
76-5-405, as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal
of Utah 1989
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
76-5-406.5, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
of Utah 1994
court shall order that the defendant make restitution
77-18-1, as last amended by Chapters 13, 198,
up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to
and 230, Laws of Utah 1994
the victim or victims of the offense of which the
77-27-9, as last amended by Chapter 13, Laws of
defendant has been convicted, or to the victim of
Utah 1994
- •
- ; - -:•any other criminal conduct admitted by the
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: defendant to the sentencing court.
T^UT-J
(ii) In determining whether restitution is
Section 1. Section 76-3-201 is amended to read:
appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences
Subsection (4)(c).
- - S L I ^ .LS -. J: ;:
•-••-.:-.r:U
allowed • Civil penalties - Restitution . ^ „
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to
Hearing - Definitions - Resentencing •
~ " this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, t o
Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with
resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of
mandatory sentences.
criminal activity in the county to which he has been
(1) As used in this section:
returned, the court may, in addition to any other
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
sentence it may impose, order that the defendant
(i) judgment of guilt; and
make restitution for costs expended by any
(ii) plea of guilty.
governmental entity for the extradition.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of
(ii) In determining whether restitution is
which the defendant is convicted or any other appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits Subsection (4)(c).
_
~
......
responsibility to the sentencing court with or
(c) In determining whether or not to order
restitution, or restitution that is complete, partial, JOT
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Passed 2/8/96, Approved 2/23/%
Effective d_;Q.Q* «*-«<
Laws of Utah 1996, Chapter 40

Criminal Penalty Adjustments
Sponsor: LyjeJ^HiUyjril, Craig L. Taylor, Mike
Dmitrich, Robert F. Montgomery, Robert C.
Steiner, L. Alma Mansell, Eldon A. Money, Lane
Beattie, Craig A. Peterson, Scott N. Howell, Millie
M. Peterson, Alarik Myrin, Stephen J. Rees,
Charles H. Stewart, Wilford R. Black Jr, David L.
Watson, David H. Steele, Leonard M. Blackham
• \

An Act Relating to the Criminal Code and the
Code of Criminal Procedure; Amending
Sentencing Provisions On Aggravated
Murder, Murder, and Sexual Offenses
Against Children; Making Nonmandatory
the Minimum Sentences; Providing for
M a n d a t o r y Imprisonment; Amending
Related Provisions On Probation and
Parole; and Making Technical Changes.

i
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This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated
1953 as follows:
AMENDS:
76-3-201 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special
Session
76-3-406 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special
Session
76-4-102, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws
of Utah 1983
76-4-202, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws
of Utah 1983
76-5-301.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First
Special Session
76-5-302 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special
Session
76-5-402.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First
Special Session
76-5-402.3 (Effective 04/29/96), as last
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First
Special Session
76-5-403.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First
Special Session
76-5-404.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First
Special Session
76-5-405 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special
Session
76-5-406.5 (Effective 04/29/%), as last
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First
^ ^ — -

A-

A-
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REPEALS:
76-3-201.3, as enacted by Chapter 10, Laws of
Utah 1995, First Special Session
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 76-3-201 (Effective 04/29/
96) is amended to read:
76-3-201 (Effective 04/29/96). Sentences or
combination of sentences allowed - Civil
penalties - Restitution - Hearing - Definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) " Conviction * includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of
which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal
conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special
damages, but not general damages, which a person
could recover against the defendant in a civil action
arising out of the facts or events constituting the
defendant's criminal activities and includes the
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including
rankings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or
transportation and as further defined in Subsection
(4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the
court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as
a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant
in the defendant's criminal activities.
p i y i t h i n the limit* prescribed by this chaptcrT a
court may sentence a person convicted of an offense
to any one of the' following sentences^ or
combination of th e m !
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public
or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically
provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(0 on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison
without parole; or
•*-.*• *
[(g) on or after Apn1 29, 1996, to imprisonment
at not less than five years and which may} [be for
life for an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4,
and Sections 76 5 30LI and 76-5-302; 1 fori
[(b)] (g) to death.
^75
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of
authority conferred by law to:
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UNDER ROE V. LUNffiTROM. 89' UTAH at 525*
It' the ordinance fails to fix a penalty
fjjr its violation^ it is unenforceable. This principle is aptly
stated in the case of Moorehouse v. Hammond,, 60 Utah 593,
209 P. 883,885:
— ~ — — « — —
"There are in this state no crimes or offenses, except such as are
created by statute or ordinance, and a_court is powerless to impose a -4^rT
penalty not prescribed_by a- -*-*--*-- -an
- ordinance:
-- J *
-and
- J Lhence -a
^
statute or
siatutel^ofmnance making
makini it a crime or offense to do a certain act,
without attaching a penalty to the doing of such act, is inoperative, f ^d {
and incapable ot being given any Effect by "the courts."
~A
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Moorehouse T. Hammond, 60 Utah 693

. ' • • • •
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'1 *'A description or doflnitlon of an act necessary to constitute A
erlmo docs not make the commission oC such acts & crime, unless
there is a punishment- annexed. Punishment is aa necessary to
constitute a crime as definition. • # •••

It W&3 accordingly held in that case that a statute which
does not impose a penalty is unenforceable. The same question was before the sumc court again in Matter of Ellsworth,
, 165 Cal 677, 133 Pac. 272, where an ordinance relating to
the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors was in question. The ordinance in (hat case, as in the case ot bar, failed
to impose any penalty or punishment for its violation, and it
rtaa again held that the ordinance was without force or effect

4~C
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|In New Orleans v. Stein, 137 La. G52, G9 South. 43, thc^dc^
fondant was convicted of violating the provisions of a ecrtuin
.ordinance relating to the public health. The defendant lap.
poaled from the conviction, contending that, in view thattho
ordinance under wliich he was couvicted failed to impose a
penalty or punishment, the sentence imposed by the court
was illegal and void. The court sustained the contention.
,The law is clearly stated in the hcadnotc as follows:
fj
"There aro hi this state no crimes or offenses except such us are
created by statuto or ordinance, and^court la powerless to Imuoae
a penalty not prescribed by a statute or an ordinance; and hcncV A
statute or ordinance making It a crime or offense to do a czrthin
act, without attaching a penalty to the doing of such nct^ U i r W •
^era^lve, and Incapable ot bejog given any effect by too courts."
-

The same question was before the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Cribb v. State, 9 Fla., where, at page 418,
after referring to the statute under which the conviction was
had, tlio court said:
"But the difficulty of sustaining: the conviction and Judgment
under this count Is that, although it [the statute] enjoins or forbids
the resident from holding the license, no penalty or remedy by indictment is prescribed. • • • The statute that creates the offonse has not. proscribed the penalty."

It was accordingly held that the judgment of eouvictiou
was illegal. It is not necessary to pursue the question or the
authorities further. It must be manifest to every lawyer that
crimes can only be created by the Legislature or by its express
authority, and that, unless a criminal-statute or ordinance
•

prescribes a penalty for its violation, the courts are powerless to enforce the same. The judgment of the justice's court,
which was produced in evidence at the hearing before the defendant and the committee of physicians, was therefore without force or effect, and the recommendation or report of the
physicians to the defendant,.being based thereon, was likewise without any legal force or effect. In view, therefore,
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• jurisdiction cannot l>c waived and jurisdicjuri
linn cannot be conferred U|KIII a *
court by consent, inaction or stipulation.,
'(jaBTorttia v. ZaRuc. 4<3 U JL.109. 93 S.CL
'390, zCL.Ed2±MZ(ffl2); Malta v. Ilogan,
-' 392 FJ&TC8G (lOUi Cir. 19C8k-If « « paK
Iks do not raise the question of lack of
- jurisdiction, it is the duty of U«c federal
court tojiclcnninc tlw waller sua stnnlc -•
-> "ffiSo V. Utoh-JJoivaya^ JJghl Compaqr, '
495 F.2d900^909 flQth Cir."l9?4^ A court
_ jacking jurisdiction cannot rentier judgment
but must dismiss the cause at *ny stage ml
Ac proceedings iii which, jtjwxomcs apparent tint jurisdiction is lacking. Mitchell r. .
*«55G.?»3 U5.237, 55.S.XX 1C2,7? LJJdT
~ .T»(TO4):
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S e c 18. {At6sunder—-Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
..
No bill of attainder, eg post facto law, or law I D ?
pairing the^obligation of contracts shall be passed.
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ARTICLE VI
LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT
Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House anii-*
People.]
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested:
*;; *» * Senate and House of Representatives whffi
shah, oe designated the Legislature of the StateoT
*TTIn the people of the State >n Utah, as hereinafter
stated:

i£t
Section 4. Section 76-5-302 is amended* to read:
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping
(i) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority
of law and against the will of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains,
or transports the victim with intent:
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or ; s a shield
or hostage, or to compel a third person i- ngage in
particular conduct or to forbear from ? paging in
particular conduct; or •4-4.
tempted
(b) to facilitate the commission,
commission, or flight after commifsion ot .aicinpted
commission of a felony; or +*£
ri/c the
(c) to inflict bodily injury on cr to «c
victim or another; or ^K>
(d) to interfere with the performative «»f any
governmental or political function: o r / t ^
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in
- —
Part 4 of this chapter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the
result of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is
mentally incompetent or younger than [sixteen] £6
years and the detention or moving is accomplished
without the effective consent of the victim's
custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco
parentis to the victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first
degree punishable on__or_after May !_, 1995, by (a)
ai
!_JHde^cniunate term (which--is—a—minimum
mandatory-term] of imprisonment |of Sy-4Qr-ef-44
years and which may be for| at not less than 5 years
u.^sfc.
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•INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of
. i

aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, you must find from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime:
1)

Said defendant, David Darnell Tindall

2)

intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law
and against the will of the victim (V. Campbell),

3)

by any means and in any manner, seized, confined,
detained or transported a person (V. Campbell) with
intent:
'
*
to facilitate the commission, attempted
commission or flight after commission
or attempted commission of a felony
and/or
b)

to inflict bodily injury on or to
terrorize a person (V. Campbell)
and/or -4h^
to hold as a shield or hostage or tflo
compel a third person to engage in
particular conduct or to forbear from
engaging in particular conduct
..

aasLlax- 4rt
d)

to interfere with performance of any
governmental or political function

(-vfr-A(flllti*i* /ftAjl- A f e * T^/nfL tolfi Mi

Mom*tf-

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all
of the essential elements of that offense beyond a reasonable
~?r

doubt, J.t^is your duty to convict the defendant of aggravated

it

LJfflJP/lt

kidnapping, a first degree' felony.,,
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DISTRIBUTION OF
. POWERS
Section
1. (Three deportments of government.I
Section 1. [Three d e p n r t m e n t s of government,!
The powern of the government of the Slntc of Ulnh
shnll ho divided into three distinct deportments, the
legislative, the Executive, nnd the Judicial; on^juj^
prison clmfgcd with the exercise ofpowcrs properly/
beion^inrr <o oiic o£ these departments, ajiaiM!xercis_e
nny junctions

nppcrtnTtTmyTocTtltc^T^TTT^^rricr^
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CXCCfl
mittcd.
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o' per-

mitted.
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And. A conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or
taken along with the first. Added to; together with;
joined with; as well as; including. Sometimes construed as "or." Land & Lake Ass'n v. Conklin, 182 A.D.
546, 170 N.Y.S. 427, 428.
It expresses a general relation or connection, a participation or accompaniment in sequence, having no inherent meaning standing alone but deriving force from
what comes before and after. In its conjunctive sense
the word is used to conjoin words, clauses, or sentences,
expressing the relation of addition or connection, and
signifying that something is to follow in addition to that
which proceeds and its use implies that the connected
elements must be grammatically co-ordinate, as where
the elements preceding and succeeding the use of the
words refer to the same subject matter. While it is said
that there is no exact synonym of the word in English, it
has been defined to mean "along with", "also", "and
also", "as well as", besides", "together with". Oliver v.
Oliver, 286 Ky. 6, 149 S.W.2d 540, 542.

• i

~ Or* n, A term used in heraldry, and signifying gold;
called sol" by some heralds when it occurs in the arms
of princes, and "topaz" or "carbuncle" when borne by
peers. Engravers represent it by an indefinite number
of small points.
Or, conj. A disjunctive particle used to express an alter- J
native or to give a choice of one among two or morel
things. It is also used to clarify what has already been
said, and in such cases, means "in other words," "towit," or "that is to say." The word "or" is to be used as
a function word to indicate an alternative between different or unlike things. City of Toledo v. Lucas County
Budget Commission, 33 Ohio St.2d 62, 294 N.E.2d 661,
663. In some usages, the word "or" creates a multiple
rather than an alternative obligation; where necessary
in interpreting an instrument, "or" may be construed to
maan "and." Atchison v. City of Englewood, Colo., 568 f.
P.2d 13, 18.

j f r j ^ n d / o r " means either or both of. Poucher v. State,
287 Ala. 731, 240 So.2d 695, 695. When expression
"and/or" is used, that word may be taken as will best
effect the purpose of the parties as gathered from the
contract taken as a whole, or, in other words, as wilL,
best accord wjth the equjtv of the situation. Bobrow v.
U. S. Casualty C5T231 A.D. 91, 246 N.Y.S. 363, 367.
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BURDEN OF PROOF
_7fi-l«501.

Presumption of iru>octnce — "Element oTihe o'fTcnseTiLnind ».
. (1) A defendant in a criminal procecdinc is pre>Mm*TlfiJag HP^g"'- until each clement of the offense charged against him »s proved brvond a reason'
• bjt doubt. In absence 01 such proof, the defendant
thai! D* a c q u i t ^

.r^z. (?' Ai used in this pan the words "element of the
ofJenaa" mean:
lai The conduct, attendant eircumsLances. or
result* of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definiuontof the oflenae;
(bi The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not
elements of the offense but shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
II7J
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KIDNAPING
76-5-301. Kidnaping.
( D A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without authority of law
and against the will of the victim:
(a) Detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or
(b) Detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; or
(c) Holds another in involuntary servitude; or
(d> Detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian.
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 1983
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76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. M~4
il) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority
of law and against the wiil of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains,
or transports the victim with intent:
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield
oriiostage. or to compei a third person to engage
in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging
in particular conduct: or
i£^To facilitate the"Tommission, attempted
commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of a feiony; or
ifi^To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another: or
^d) To interfere with the performance of any
governmental or political function: or
(fr* Tn commit a sexuai offense as described in
Part 4 of this chaoter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the resuit of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent,
guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the victim.
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MM lo defree • Convicted only on"» .
* lowest.
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• •. When it appeart the* defendant has committed a .
public'offense and there is reasonable* doubt as to':
which, of jwo or more decrees he.i* guilty ..jhejrtjgjM
c
be convicted only of the lower degreg./
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j

JpilinU'd without a law nutjiorj^ngjtj JUuT.l^cJi Ja^Tmiat
JJRjdl^^^yiT.i^.^ai..,.^' 0 c l ° not think'That tho'scctionB""
referred to gave "the plaintiff power to punish tho defendants fur the ofTensd charged against them. Tho order of
the distri.it court, therefore, sustaining i} i C demurrer, was ..
j-.roper.
'
*
The order* and judgment of the district court are affirmed.
I
}
I

Arranging for the distribution of h coo- ;
trolled substance. •
The Controlled Substances Act expressly and
specifically sanctions the offense of arranging
for the distribution of a control led.subntance;
therefore, pursuant to §§ 58-37-lJ and
76-1-103, defendant was required to be ckargcd_
with such otlense under § 58-37-8(l)(aXiv) oT
the Controlled Substances Act, and it was error'"'
barge him under this section. Si ate v.
« . 659. y.U 1038 fUuk 1563>; :
"

h Mtk^Mfj i&f. BdAZO QMiBS^
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Timmy HILL, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 19275.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 26, 1984.

Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, Utah County, John F.
Walhquist, J., of theft by deception and he
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J.,
held that defendant should have been
charged with distribution of an imitation
controlled substance.
Reversed.

QrzR-^fiiU^£<su^(Ak

^TmloM-m^ nL

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent*
v,
Leonard SCOTT, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860284.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 15, 1987.
Defendant was convicted in the Sixth
District Court, Sevier County, Louis G. Tervort, J., of distribution of controlled substance for value, and he appealed. The
Supreme Court held that defendant, who
was alleged to have committed acts within
coverage of offense of arranging to distribute controlled substance, could not be
charged with aiding and abetting another
in distribution of controlled substance.
Reversed and remanded for new trial,
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Article I, section 24- of the Utah Constitution statesJ^All laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation." The principle that
"persons similarly situated should be treated
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same," Malan v.
Leuris, 693 P.2d 661, 699 (Utah 1984), is sofundamental to Utah law that Article I, section 2 of the Utah Constitution declares that
an integral purpose of a free government is
to ensure the equal protection of the law to •
the people.
The test for determining whether "laws of
a general nature ... have uniform application" is twofold. "First, a law must apply
equally to all persons within a class. Second,
the statutory classifications and the different
treatment given the classes must be based on
differences that have a reasonable tendency
to further the objectives of the statute." Id.
at 670 (citations omitted). 'Whether a law
operates uniformly under Article I, section
24 is a judicial question.
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S e c 1& ^Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

S e c 10. (Powers denied the states.}
(1.1 No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance,
or confederation; grant letters of marque and repri*al; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts;
pass any bill of attainder, jn Pft^ f f l g t n i a w r o r **w
impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant any
title of nobility.
(2.1 No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may- be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of
all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to
the Revision and Control of the Congress.
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships
of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreements or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power,
or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger asvw^ii not admit of delay.
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I BETTER GET MY ALLEGATIONS.

YOU HEARD FROM THE COURT

CLERK, THE FIRST COUNT IN THIS CASE IS CALLED AGGRAVATED
KIDNAPPING.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE A THOUGHT IN THEIR MIND AS TO

WHAT KIDNAPPING MIGHT BE.

SOME OF US ARE OLD ENOUGH TO

REMEMBER THE LINDBURGJCIDNAPPING, FOR EXAMPLE.

I'M GOING TO

TELL YOU THAT IN A KIDNAPPING, IN AN AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, A
VICTIM NEED NOT BE RESTRAINED FOR ANY PERIOD OF TIME. THERE
IS NO MINIMUM PERIOD OF TIME BEFORE AN AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING
TAKES PLACE. DO ANY OF YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THAT CONCEPT?
OKAY.

I ASSUME BY THE FACT THAT NOBODY HAS RAISED HIS OR

HER HAND THAT THERE IS NOT A PROBLEM WITH THAT.

S mty "lip0®*}BtokMrfh9fin. ^

Mmjtf m£kzk

S^mm^&m^^mWi^
A -CrrtifAzterzr )[&£&{£&{*$*'"*?*h*

J & ^^^^/Cflff^f

4ifMk4&'*»lte&A

i/.*.e r/

«m/J*

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the
, credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which the witness
~~
was convicted, and evidence that an accused has
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted
_^
if the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
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Rule 9 . Grounds for discipline.
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to:
(a)
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct
or any other rules of this jurisdiction regarding
professional conduct of lawyers;
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

James Devon LANIER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 880101.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 31, 1989.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
- District Court, Salt Lake County, Richard
H. Moffat, J., of aggravated robbery, and
_ he appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham,
J., held that error in ruling that defentidns were admissfl>le for impeachment p u t
Reversed and remanded
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76-5-302.- Aggravated kidnapuig\l) A person commits aggravatea Kidnaping if the
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority
of law and against the wiii of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains,
or transports the victim with intent:
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield
"orliostage. or to compel a third person to engage
in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging
in particular conduct: or
(b> To facilitate the commission, attempted
commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony: or
- ?<M Tn inflict bodily injury on or to terronze the
victim or another, or
J\> interfere with the performance of any
governmental or political function: or
le» To commit a sexuai offense as described in
Part 4 of this chaoter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent,
?uardian» or person acting in loco parentis to the victim.

BURDEN OF PROOF j U ^
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense" defined.
( D A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved Devon?
vond a reason'able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant
"be acauitt '
^
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not
elements of the offense but shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
lm
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"Generally, ._a person has constructive
possession of narcotics if he knowingly has ownership, dominion or
-4
1
T
?
j — control over the narcotics and the premises where the narcotxcs
are found." United States v. Haaer. 969 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir.
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BURDEN OF PROOF
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense" defined.
( D A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(h) The culpable mental state rpnuir**^
—
r
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and1 venue are not
elements of the offense but shall be established by
preponderance of the evidence. Jfr < ^ " " ~
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" "A description or dofinlllon of an act necessary to constitute a
crime docs not make the commission of such acta a crime, unless
there is a punishment- annexed. Punishment Is aa necessary to
constitute a crime as dcflnltlon. • • •- '

' I t was accordingly held in that case that a statute which
does not impose a penalty is unenforceable. The same ques-.
tion was before the same court again in Matter of Ellsworth,
^65 Cal. 677, 133 Pac. 272, where an ordinance relating to
the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors was in qucstlon. The ordinance in that case, as in the case nt bar, failed
to impose any penalty or punishment for its violation, and it
Was again held that the ordinance was without force or effect
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the case, he, nevertheless, could not prevail, since, in the j u d g ment of this court, his c o n s t r u c t i o n of the s t a t u t e is clearly
untenable.
There is therefore no m e r i t in counsel's contention, a n d
h n i r e the petition for a r e h e a r i n g should be, a n d it accordingly is, denied.
C O R F M A N , C. J . , a n d " W E B E R , G I D E O N , a n d T1IUR^fAX, J J . , concur.

M O O R E I I O U S E v. H A M M O N D , D i r e c t o r of Registration.
No. 3S60. Decided October 4, 1922. (209 Pac. SS3.)
1.

PHYSICIANS ANT> SLROKONS—ORDINANCE REQUIRING GREATER DUTIES THAN STATUTE RELATING TO REVOCATION OF PHYSICIAN'S

LICENSE HELD INVALID.

Where Comp. Laws 1017, § 444S, as

amended by Laws 1921, c. 91, defines the acts or omissions on
the part of a physician which would authorize the revocation
of his license, an ordinance, in the absence of statutory authority, cannot impose greater or different duties in that respect. 1
2.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—ORDINANCE

PHOVIDKD WITHOUT FORCE.

FOR WHICH

NO PENALTY

Where an ordinance docs not pre-

scribe a penalty for its violation, the courts are powerless to
enforce it.
3.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION—FAILURE OF PHYSICIAN TO RETORT
INFECTIOUS DISEASE " I N WRITING" NOT AN OFFENSE. Where the

complaint alleged that accused, a physician, in violation of an
ordinance, willfully failed to report in writing a case of infectious disease, defendant could not be convicted under Comp.
Laws 1017, § 444S, as amended by Laws 1921, c. 91. merely requiring a physician to rei>ort the existence of such a case.
Original application for a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i by Charles V.
Moorehouse to be d i r e c t e d to J a m e s T . H a m m o n d , Director
of Registration.
W R I T ISSUED.

i Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 Utah, 59G.
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Moorehouse v. Hammond, 60 Utah 593
Certiorari
A, W. Agce, of Ogden, for plaintiff.
Harvey

JJ. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and L. A. Miner, Asst. Atty.

Gen., for defendant.
PRICK, J.
On August 30, 1922, the plaintiff made application in due
form to this court for a writ of certiorari to be directed to
the defendant as director of registration requiring the latter
to certify up the proceedings in a certain matter in which the
defendant, as director of registration, made and entered an
order in which he revoked and annulled the license theretofore granted and issued to the plaintiff to practice medicine
and surgery in this state, which order the plaintiff alleged to
be in excess of the defendant's jurisdiction, and for that reason should be set aside. The writ was duly issued and
served upon the defendant, and in compliance therewith he
has certified the record of the proceedings had before him in
the matter aforesaid to this court.
Upon the record being certified to this court the plaintiff
moved for judgment in his favor upon the proceedings certified as aforesaid. The cause was duly argued and submitted
to this court by counsel for the respective parties upon the
motion aforesaid.
From the record of the proceedings had before the defendant it appears that a complaint in writing was duly filed in
the office of the defendant as director of registration, in which
it was charged that the plaintiff—
"while practicing under Paid license, haa been guilty of 'unprofessional conduct* • * • In the following particulars: That tho
said Chas. V. Moorehouse willfully failed to report in writing to
the health officer the existence of a case of infectious disease which *•
he was treating at Junction, Piute county, on the 14th day of February, 1920. In further support of this allegation the complainant
alleges that a complaint waB made before the justice of tho peace
of the town of Junction, In Piute county, state of Utah, charging
him with the said offense, and that he, the said Chas. V. Moorehouse, was duly arrested under a warrant issued on tho said comAl ipt and brought into court on tho 31st day of March, 1920, and

he then and there pleaded guilty to the said charge and was adjudged guilty by the court and ordered to pay a fine of $25. The
complainant therefore requests that.a citation be issued requiring
the said defendant to show why his license to practice medicine and
surgery should not be revoked."

Upon the foregoing complaint a hearing was had before the
defendant and a committee of physicians, as provided by our
statute. The committee, after hearing the evidence, made
their report or recommendation to the defendant in the following words:
"We, the committee designated by tho director for that purpose,
report that we have heard the evidenco submitted in the proceedings in this department to revoke the license of Charles V. Moorehouse, and from such evidence we And that the said Charles V.
Moorehouse is guilty of unprofessional conduct as charged in the
complaint filed herein, and we recommend that his license to practice medicine and surgery be revoked by the department "
The defendant, in pursuance of such recommendation, entered the following order:
"Under tho findings and recommendation of the corr.mittee and
under the provisions of the statute It is hereby ordered that the
license to practice medicine and surgery in the state of Utah Issued
to Dr. Charles V. Moorehouse on the 6th day of July, K l l , by tho
State Board of Medical Examiners and numbered 6S&, t-.\ and the
same Is hereby, revoked and canceled."
Considerable evidence was produced at the hearing before
the defendant, which it is not necessary to set forth. We
shall, however, in the course of this opinion, refer to such
portions thereof as are deemed material.
From the original complaint filed against the plaintiff liefore the defendant it is made to appear that the plaintiff
had been charged with the same offense before a justice of
the peace and had pleaded guilty to such charge, and. in pursuance of such plea, the justice adjudged that he pay a fine
of $25. The judgment of conviction entered in such justice's
court was produced before the defendant and said committee
as evidence that the plaintiff had been charged in said justice's court with the offense of unprofessional conduct, and

that by entering a pica of guilty he had confessed or admit fed
his guilt.
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It will be observed that the real charge preferred against
the plaintiff both in the justice's court and before the defendant is that he had "willfully failed to report in writing to
the health officer/' etc. In view that the plaintiff was
charged with the violation of a certain ordinance, it becomes
important to consider the language of the same. The ordinance reads as follows:
"It shall be the duty of every physician In this town to report to
the president, In writing, every person who Is affected with any
contagious or infectious disease, such as cholera, diphtheria, yellow
fover, scarlet fever, typhoid fever, whooping cough, measles, mumps,
smallpox, varioloid, or any of the grades of such diseases Immediately after he shall be satisfied of the nature of the disease, and to
report to tho same officer every case of duath from any of said diseases Immediately after It occurs."
In this connection it also becomes important to keep in
mind our statute upon which the aforesaid ordinance was
predicated and upon which the defendant relies to sustain
his order revoking plaintiff's license to practice medicine and
surgery in this state. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 4448, as
amended by chapter 91, Laws Utah 1921, so far as material
here, defines what shall constitute "unprofessional conduct"
authorizing the revocation of a physician's license as follows:
"Willful violation of the law In regard to the registration of
births and deaths and the reporting of infectious diseases."
In another section (272G) the duty imposed upon physicians and surgeons respecting contagious diseases is stated
thus:
"All physicians and other persons having Knowledge of the existence of any contagions or infectious disease, or having reason to
believe that any such disease exists, are hereby required to repori
the same forthwith to the local board of health."
It will thus be seen that, while the statute merely requires
a physician to report " t h e existence of any contagious or infectious diseases * • # to the local board of health," the
ordinance to which reference has been made, and which was
the basis of the charge against the plaintiff both before the
justice of the peace and the defendant, required that a report
be made " i n writing." The ordinance therefore required
£ g from the physician than did the statute. While the

cities and towns, including boards of health, in this slate are
given ample power to pass and enforce ordinances and to
promulgate and enforce rules and regulations respecting' the
public health and to require certain things to be done in case
of contagious and infectious diseases, yet where, as here, the
statute specifically defines what act or acts of commission or
omission on the part of a physician shall constitute
"unprofessional conduct" authorizing the revocation
1
of his license to practice medicine, an ordinance, in the
absence of express statutory authority, cannot impose greater
or different duties in that regard than the statute imposes.
This court, in Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 Utah, 5.%, 1:1-1 Pac.
558, held that, where the statute merely authorized the imposition of a fine for a particular offense, an ordinance might
not impose a fine and imprisonment as punishment for the
same offense, but must be restricted to the penalty authorized
by statute.
However, if it were held that the ordinance in question here
and upon which the charge against the plaintiff was predicated could impose the duty of reporting contagious anil infectious diseases in writing, yet the ordinance, for other reasons, is wholly without force or effect. 13y reference to the
ordinance it will be seen that it does not declare a refusal or
omission to make a report unlawful; nor does it impose any
penalty or punishment for such refusal or omission. The
ordinance therefore merely amounts to a direction to the
physician :o make a report. In view that it does not denounce the omission or failure to report as unlawful
nor impose any penalty or punishment for a failure
2
to make a report the ordinance is clearly unenforceable. The imposition of the fine by the justice was therefore
clearly beyond his power and constituted manifest usurpation.
Courts cannot impose penalties unless authorized by statute. Neither can they impose other or different penalties
than those authorized by statute. The courts have had frequent occasion to pass upon such matters. The Supreme
Court of California, in People v. McNuIty, 93 Cal. 427, 26
Pae. 5!)7, states the law thus:
JL^
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"A description or definition of an act necessary to constitute a
crime does not make the commission of such acts a crime, unless
thore is a punishment' annexed. Punishment is as necessary to
constitute a crime as definition. • • •"
It was accordingly held in that case that a statute which

does not impose a penalty is unenforceable. The same question was before the same court again in Matter of Ellsworth,
165 Cal. 677, 133 Pac. 272, where an ordinance relating to
the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors was in question. The ordinance in that case, as in the case at bar, failed
to impose any penalty or punishment for its violation, and it
was again held that the ordinance was without force or effect.
In NLW Orleans v. Stein, 137 La. 652, 69 South. 43, the defendant was convicted of violating tho provisions of a certain
ordinance relating to the public health. The defendant appealed from the conviction, contending that, in view that tho
ordinance under which he was convicted failed to impose a
penalty or punishment, the sentence imposed by the court
was illegal and \oid. The court sustained the contention.
The law is clearly stated m the headnote as follows:
"There are in this state no crimes or offenses except such as are
created by statute or ordinance, and a court is powerless to impose
a penalty not prescribed by a statute or an ordinance; and hence a
statute or ordinance making it a crime or offense to do a certain
act, without attaching a penalty to the doing of such act, is inoperative, and incapable of being given any effect by the courts."

The same question was before the Supreme Couit of Florida in the case of Cnbb v. State, 9 Fla., where, at page 418,
after referring to the statute under which the con\iction was
had, tho court said:
"But the difficulty of sustaining the conviction and judgment
under this count is that, although it [the statute] enjoins or forbids
the resident from holding the license, no penalty or remedy by indictment Is prescribed. • • • The statute that creates the offense has not prescribed the penulty."
It was accordingly held that the judgment of comictiou
was illegal It is not neeessan to pursue the question or the
authorities further. It must be manifest to every lawyer that
crimes can only be created by the Legislature or by its express
llphority, and that, unless a criminal statute or ordinance
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prescribes a penalty for its violation, the courts are powerless to enforce the same. The judgment of the justice's court,
which was produced in evidence at the hearing before the defendant and the committee of physicians, was therefore without force or effect, and the recommendation or report of the
physicians to the defendant, being based thereon, was likewise without any legal force or effect In view, therefore,
that the recommendation or report of the physicians fails, it
follows as a necessary corollary that the order of the defendant based thereon revoking the license of the physician must
likewise fail and must be held without legal force or effect.
It is contended by counsel for the defendant, however, that
although the conviction under the ordinance fails, the order
of the defendant revoking the plaintiff's license should nevertheless be upheld for the reason that the plaintiff has failed
to comply with the provisions of the statute in that he failed
to make a report "to the local board of health." The record
of the proceedings certified up shows that a member of the
boaid of trustees of the town in which plaintiff practiced, who
was a witness at the hearing, testified that he was the authorized quarantine officer of the town aforesaid; that he was
present at the house of the afflicted person, and that the
plaintiff informed the witness as the quarantine officer of the
town and a member of the board of trustees that the patient
was afflicted with small pox; that immediately upon recehing
such information the witness put up a sign quarantining the
house in whiqh the patient was confined. There is neither dispute nor conflict respecting the facta thus testified to by the
witness aforesaid. No doubt the principal purpose of the
statute requiring that a report of contagious and infectious
diseases be forthwith made to the local boards of health is
that the afflicted person may be properly quarantined and the
public warned so that contact with the diseased person may
be avoided and the spread of the contagion or infection prevented. All this was clearly accomplished in this case by
plaintiff's report to the member of the town board who was
the quarantine officer, and whose duty it was to act, \|^ '£

COO

SUPREME COURT Otf UTAH

'

[Sept.

1922]

SUPREME COURT OP UTAH

Moorehouse v. Hammond, 60 Utah 593

he did by quarantining the house in which the afflicted person
was.
But, quite apart from all this, what the plaintiff in fact
was charged with was that lie had '* willfully failed to report
in writing to the health officer the existence of a case of infectious disease, which he was treating," etc. The statute
does not require a report in writing, but merely requires that
a report be made. We have already pointed out that the
evidence is without conflict that a report was in fact
made to a member of the town board who was then
3
quarantine officer. The provisions of the statute were
thus substantially complied with, and that is all that the law
requires. Under our system of jurisprudence the penalties
prescribed in criminal statutes can be imposed and the privileges of the accused can be forfeited only in cases where it
is clear that the provisions of the law have been violated.
Courts cannot add terms or conditions, much less impose
penalties not expressly authorized by the statute. Nor can
an accused person be convicted of an offense other than the
one stated in the complaint filed against him. In view, therefore, that in this case it appears that the plaintiff was charged
with having failed to report in writing, he cannot be convicted
unless he failed to so report. Moreover, inasmuch as the
statute required him to report the existence of the disease
only, and the evidence being conclusive that he did report
the same to the quarantine officer, who was also a member of
the town board, and that the patient was quarantined and
the principal purposes of the statute thus accomplished, the
order revoking the license finds no support in the law, and
therefore cannot be permitted to stand.
In concluding this opinion we desire to add that we arc
very reluctant to interfere with the orders of the boards of
health in carrying into effect the rules, regulations, and ordinances relating to the prevention of disease and the protection
of the public health. In enforcing such rules, regulations,
and ordinances the boards of health are exercising the highest functions of government, and they should not be interfered with unless it is clear that they have exceeded the
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bounds of their authority. Where, however, as here, the
rights of a citizen have been invaded and lie lias been condemned without authority of law and has had his license
to practice his profession revoked, we have no alternative
save to correct the wrong by annulling and setting aside the
order by which his privileges have been denied him. It is
therefore ordered that the order of the director of registration, the defendant herein, by which the license of the plaintiff was attempted to be revoked and annulled be, and the
same is hereby, vacated and set aside and the license of the
plaintiff is reinstated and adjudged to be in full force and
effect until revoked in accordance with law.
It appearing to this court, however, in acting as a public
official, that the defendant proceeded in good faith in making
the order aforesaid, neither party is allowed costs.
COItFMAN, C. J., and WEBER, GIDEON, and THURMAN, J J . , concur.

B A N K E R S ' COMMERCIAL SECURITY CO. v. DISTRICT
COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY.
No. 3S3C. Decided October 4, 1922. Rehearing denied January 3,
1923. (211 Pac. 1S7.)
1. MANDAMUS—Ox

DEMURRER, ALLEGATIONS OF PETTITION MTST BE

ACCEPTED AS TBUE. In mandamus proceedings, where defendant lias demurred to the petition and the matter is submitted
on that state of the record, the allegations of tho petition must
bo accepted as true.
2. MANDAMUS—€OUBT WILL NOT BE COEBCED UNLESS RIGHT or
GBIEVED PARTY FREE FROM DOUBT AND DUTY OF COURT CLEAR.

*

AoOn

mandamus proceedings directed against a court, the court will
not be coerced to act, unless tho right of the aggrieved party is
free from doubt and the duty of the court clear and free from
substantial question.!
>Kvrimcs v. Kyrimt,

45 Utah. Ififi. i « «... o
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2. APPEAL AND ERROR. Bill of exceptions would not be stricken on
ground that it was not prepared and served in time, where no
notice of entry of judgment was given, and time in which to prepare and serve bill of exceptions was extended for two months
on date when appeal was taken, and proposed bill was served
within that time (Rev. St. Utah 1933, 104-39-4 (2).
8. APPEAL AND ERROR. Assignment of error in overruling plaintiffs' demurrer would be considered as abandoned where not
argued.
4. APPEAL AND ERROR. In action for damages for unlawful and
malicious interference with plaintiffs' business, overruling of
special demurrer to defendants' answer held not reversible error
in view of conclusion reached on appeal that defendants would be
liable as joint tort-feasors (Rev. St. 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-G5,
15-G-G6,15-7-64, 16-9-9, 15-9-21, 105-3-1).
6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Municipal ordinance failing to fix
penalty for violation thereof is unenforceable.1
6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. City commissioners and police officers
of city held without power to prevent violation of ordinance which
failed to fix penalty for its violation.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to grant a new
trial in accordance with the principles herein announced.
Costs to appellant.

MOFFAT, J., being disqualified, did not participate herein.

ROE et al. v. LUNDSTROM et al.
No. 5622. Decided May 11, 1936.

(57 P. [2d] 1128.)

1. APPEAL AND ERROR, Appeal held not subject to dismissal on
ground that appeal was not taken in time in that it was not taken
within six months from date when court rendered decision, where
appeal was taken within six months from date of filing of findings, conclusions, and judgment (Rev. St. 1933, 104-31-2).
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not delegate responsibility to independent contractor and
latter^ admissions as to physical facts evidence against defendant) ; Nos. 8 to 23, inclusive, 26 to 31, inclusive, 34 to
41, inclusive (42 and 43 as aids), 44 to 46 and 49 to 55, inclusive, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63 (double question—calls for a conclusion), 64 to 75, inclusive (the latter as to agreement in
reference to angle irons), 76, 78, 80 (no evidence to support), 81, 83, 84, 86 (except as to fronts or lines theory of
damages incorrect), 87, 88, 89, 90 (because of finding of
acquiescence), 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 99, (101 to 104, inclusive,
should all be encompassed in 105), 107, 108. Respondent's
assignments Nos. 1 and 2 (on ground of improper mode of
assessing damages), 3 (but not on ground mentioned). Not
well taken: Nos. 24, 25, 32, 33, 47, 48 (to show knowledge),
56, 58, 60, 77, 79, 82, 85, 93 (conflict of evidence), 95 (conflict in evidence), 98 (conflict in evidence), 100 (conflict in
evidence), 106. Question assigned as error in No. 60 was
abandoned. Respondent's assignments Nos. 4, 5, and 6.

ELIAS HANSEN, C. J., FOLLAND and EPHRAIM
HANSON, JJ., and H. M. SCHILLER, District Judge, concur.
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7. ARREST. Police officer is protected only when armed with a warrant except in emergencies where prohibited offense or breach of
peace is committed or threatened
8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Police officer preventing customers
from entering place of business which had refused to pay license
fee required by ordinance for person to engage in business as
transient merchant held guilty of trespass so as to be liable to
owner of business, in absence of exigency contemplated by statute
to justify preventive measures (Rev. S t 1933, 15-6-66, 105-3-1).
9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Generally, municipal officer is immune
from liability in private suit for his acts in discharging corporate
duties in absence of willful negligence, malice, or corruption
constituting misfeasance (Rev. S t 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65,
15-7-2, 15-7-64).
10.

OFFICERS. Public officer vested with discretionary ministerial
power and acting within scope of his authority is not liable in
damages for error in judgment unless guilty of corruption or willful violation of law, but may not claim immunity for commission
*Moorehou«c V. Hammond, GO Utah 593. 209 P. RR.T
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of act entirely outside scope of his official duties (Rev. S t 1933,
1&-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65, 15-7-2, 15-7-64). *
11.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. In exercise of power to see that ordinances arc faithfully executed, city commissioners would be required to act as board and not informally and independently as
individuals, and informal personal interference by commissioners
with operation of police department or directions to its officers
would bo unauthorized (Rev. S t 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65,
15-7-2, 15-7-64, 15-9-9, 15-9-21).

12.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Police officer is responsible only to
head of his department to whom has been given power of his
appointment and removal from office (Rev. St. 1933, 15-9-9,
15-9-21).

13.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. City commissioners directing:, encouraging, advising, and co-operating with police officer in commission of trespass by excluding customers from place of business
of persons who refused to pay tax imposed by ordinance on
transient businesses held jointly liable with police officer for trespass, irrespective of good faith on part of police officer (Rev.
S t 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65, 15-6-66, 15-7-2, 15-7-64, 15-9-9,
15-9-21, 105-3-1).

14.

TRESPASS. Motive of trespasser is not material element to be considered in determining whether or not legal right has been invaded, although motive may be material where conduct is of such
character as to be qualifiedly privileged, or as involving right to
recover punitive damages.

Appeal from District Court, First District, Cache County; Oscar W. McConkie, Judge.
Action by H. H. Roe and another against A. G. Lundstrom
and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Henry D. Moyle, of Salt Lake City, and George D. Pres~
ton, of Logan, for appellants.
Leoii Fo-nnesbeck, of Logan, for respondents.
*Lousry v. Carbon Count]/, CA Utah 555, 232 P. 008.
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EVANS, District Judge.
This is an action in tort to recover damages for an alleged
unlawful and malicious interference with plaintiffs' business. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants Lundstrom,
Merkeley, and Pederson, as city commissioners of Logan
City, through Smith, a police officer, prevented the public
from entering the plaintiffs' place of business where the
plaintiffs proposed to conduct a sale of seasonable merchandise recently purchased by them in receivership proceedings,
and for which interference they seek actual and punitive
damages.
The defendants seek to justify their conduct by setting
up a failure on the part of the plaintiffs to procure a license
as required by the ordinances of Logan City.
The defendants move to dismiss the appeal upon the
ground that it was not taken in time. It is contended that
the appeal should have been taken within six months from
the time when the court rendered its decision, January
27, 1934. Findings, conclusions, and judgment were
1
filed and entered on February 15, 1934. The appeal ,
was taken on August 10, 1934. The motion to dismiss the
appeal is accordingly denied. R. S. Utah 1933, 104-41-2.
Defendants move to strike the bill of exceptions upon the
ground that it was not prepared and served in time. No
notice of the entry of judgment was given. On August 10,
1934, the time in which to prepare and serve the bill
of exceptions was extended to October 10, 1934. The
2
proposed bill was served on the 14th day of September, 1934. The motion to strike the bill of exceptions is,
therefore, denied. R. S. Utah 1933, 104-39-4, subd. 2.
The plaintiffs demurred generally to the answer and assign error in overruling the demurrer. This assignment,
not being argued, is abandoned. They also interposed
a special demurrer, upon the overruling of which
3, 4
error is assigned and argued in the brief. In view of
the conclusions reached by us, the overruling of the .special
demurrer does not constitute reversible error.
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The defense alleged is that the plaintiffs were not licensed
to do business, as required by the ordinances of Logan City;
that the interference complained of was in good faith to prevent a violation of law. In reply, plaintiffs allege that prior
to advertising the fact that they were going to conduct a
sale of merchandise, they tendered to the city clerk the fee
required for carrying on a merchandising business, which
tender was refused by the clerk. The plaintiffs did not deny
that they proposed to conduct their business without a
license, but claim that they had nevertheless qualified by filing an application and tendering the required fee for doing
business as merchants. They contend that the ordinance
defining transient merchants is void.
The essential facts as disclosed by the record are substantially as follows: One W. F. Mau, operating a business under
the name of Mau's Department Store, made an assignment
for the benefit of creditors. Plaintiffs ultimately acquired
the stock of merchandise so assigned, and announced by
advertisements that they intended to conduct a sale to open
on July 16th and continue for seven days, to dispose of the
entire stock and fixtures. On the 16th day of July, the day
set for the opening, the sum of $8.25 was tendered as a
license fee, together with an application for a retail merchant's license. The tender was refused and the application
denied, notwithstanding which the plaintiffs announced that
they would proceed to conduct the sale as advertised. Acting under instructions from the defendant commissioners,
the chief of police posted the defendant Smith at the entrance of the store to prevent the plaintiffs from conducting
the sale. An ordinance of Logan City provides that it shall
be unlawful for any person to engage in business as a transsient merchant without first obtaining a license, the fee for
which is fixed at $25 per day. No penalty is provided for
its violation, nor any procedure for its enforcement.
The trial court found that the ordinance defining transient
merchants, the validity of which was challenged by the
plaintiffs, was in full force and effect Upon this finding
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the appellants assign error. The provision requiring
the payment of $25 per day would not necessarily
5-8
render the entire ordinance invalid. In appropriate
proceedings, the fee required to be paid might be held to be
discriminatory. It is however, in view of the conclusion
reached, unnecessary to determine this question. In order
that the ordinance may be valid, for the purpose of instituting a criminal proceeding, the procedure for its enforcement should be provided. It is not sufficient merely to declare an act unlawful. If the ordinance fails to fix a penalty
for its violation, it is unenforceable. This principle is aptly
stated in the case of Moorehouse v. Hammond, 60 Utah 593,
209 P. 883,885:
"There are in this state no crimes or offenses, except such as are
created by statute or ordinance, and a court is powerless to impose a
penalty not prescribed by a statute or an ordinance; and hence a
statute or ordinance making it a crime or offense to do a certain act,
without attaching a penalty to the doing of such act, is inoperative,
and incapable of being given any effect by the courts."

If then the courts are without power to enforce an ordinance, it necessarily follows that the defendants would be
powerless to prevent its violation, but even though the ordinance were valid and enforceable, there still remains the
question as to whether or not the offense of selling without
a license is one which may be prevented. R. S. Utah 1933,
105-3-1, provides that:
"Public offenses may be prevented by the intervention of the officers of justice: (1) By requiring security to keep the peace. (2) By
forming B, police in cities, towns or counties, and by requiring their
attendance in exposed places. (3) By suppressing riots."

Here there existed no exigency such as is contemplated
by the statute to require or justify preventive measures.
Peace officers no longer stand as the symbol and embodiment of the law, except in film, fiction, and the lands of
traffic. Except in emergencies where a prohibited offense
or breach of the peace is committed or threatened, a police
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officer is protected only when armed with a warrant. In
this case there was neither a warrant nor an arrest. The
power conferred upon police officers to "preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders," etc.
(R. S. Utah 1933, 15-6-66), was not regularly pursued. It
is impossible to escape the conclusion that officer Smith was
guilty of a trespass.
With respect to the liability of the defendant commissioners, the situation is different and not altogether clear.
They allege in their separate answers that they advised the
plaintiffs that if they did not desire to take out an auctioneer's license, that they would be deemed to be transient
merchants and would be required to pay the license as required by the ordinance relating to transient merchants.
They deny, among other things, that Smith was their employee or agent or that they directed him to prohibit persons
from entering plaintiffs' building. Lundstrom testified
that he instructed the city marshal to have the ordinance
complied with; that he intended the marshal to post a policeman, who was kept all day upon the plaintiffs' premises with
his consent and approval; that the marshal could not have
carried out his orders in any other way; and that the policeman had done only what he had ordered him to do. It does
not appear that either Merkeley or Pederson gave any directions to the chief of police, but it was stipulated that
whatever the officer did was directed by the chief of police,
who was directed by the commissioners and in pursuance of
their orders.
It is pertinent to inquire by what right the defendant
commissioners assumed to give directions as to the enforcement of an ordinance, or as to the method of its enforcement.
The statute provides that all actions brought to recover any
fine or to enforce any penalty under an ordinance of a city
or town shall be brought in the corporate name of the city
or town as plaintiff. R. S. Utah 1933,15-7-64. It is further
provided that when power is conferred upon the board of
commissioners to perform any act and the method of exercis-
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ing such power is not specifically pointed out, the board of
commissioners may provide by ordinance the manner and
details necessary for the full exercise of such powers. R.
S. Utah 1933, 15-7-2. It is further provided that the chief
of police shall enforce all ordinances and regulations of the
city for the preservation of peace, good order, and the protection of the rights and property of all persons. R. S. Utah
1933,15-6-65. Such powers as are conferred upon city Commissioners must be exercised through formal motion, resolution, or ordinance which must be reduced to writing and
read before a vote is taken thereon, and no act of the board
shall be valid or binding unless two members concur therein.
R. S. Utah 1933, 15-6-13. The boards of commissioners are
legislative and governing bodies. R. S. Utah 1933, 15-6-5.
Executive and administrative powers in cities of the first
and second class are distributed among five departments,
each of which is assigned to one of the commissioners.
If tJie defendant commissioners are to be charged with
liability, it must be upon the theory that they are joint tortfeasors. It is a general rule that a municipal officer is immune from liability in a private suit for his acts in
the discharge of corporate duties in the absence of 9, 10
willful negligence, malice, or corruption constituting
misfeasance. Smith V. Steplian, 66 Md. 381, 7 A. 561, 10 A.
671; Worley V. Inhabitants of Columbia, 88 Mo. 106; Rocrig
v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 231,175 N. W. 542; 2 Cooley on Torts
(4th Ed.) § 300 et seq.; 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) § 556, and it is often asserted that where a
public officer is by law vested with discretionary ministerial
powers, and acts within the scope of his authority, he is not
liable in damages for an error in judgment unless guilty of
corruption or willful violation of the law. He may not,
however, claim immunity for the commission of an act entirely outside of the scope of his official duties. Lowry v.
Carbon County, 64 Utah 555, 232 P. 908; Mock V. Santa Rosa,
126 Cal. 330, 58 P. 826; Bolton v. Vellines, 94 Va. 393, 26 S.
E. 847, 64 Am. S t Rep. 737; Burch V. Hardwicke, 30 Grafc.
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(71 Va,) 24, 32 Am. Rep. 640; Craig V. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728;
2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) § 556.
Now let us assume that the defendant commissioners are
charged with the duty of seeing that the ordinances are
faithfully executed. In the exercise of this power, they
would necessarily have to act as a board and not informally and independently as individuals. If we are 11,12
to give effect to the provision that when power is conferred upon the board of commissioners to perform any act,
they may provide by ordinance the manner and details necessary to the full exercise of such powers, then any informal
personal interference with the operation of the police department or any directions to its officers would appear to
be wholly unjustified and entirely beyond the powers conferred upon the board, or upon the individual commissioners,
as such, except possibly the commissioner of public safety.
The duties of police officers are very definitely prescribed
and fixed by law. A police officer is responsible only to the
head of his department, to whom has been given the power
of his appointment and removal from office. R. S. Utah
1933, 15-9-9 and 15-9-21.

The law is well settled that those who aid in the commission of a wrongful act by another are liable for the resulting
damages, although they expected no benefits from the
wrongful act and, in fact, received none. Brwmley V. Chattanooga Speedway, etc., Co.f 138 Tenn. 534, 198 S. W. 775.
Breedlove V. Bundy, 96 Ind. 319; Fchenthal V. Thieben, 23
111. App. 569; Revert v. Hesse, supra [184 Cal. 295, 193 P.
943]; Mox, Inc., V. Woods, supra [202 Cal. 675, 262 P. 302.]
Blair v. Guarantee Title Co., 103 Cal. App. 260, 284 P. 719,
724; 62 C. J. 1129.

Whether we view this case as one in which the commissioners acted beyond the scope of their powers or as a
failure on their part to regularly pursue powers con- 13,14
ferred, the result would be the same, for under this
record the commissioners admittedly directed, encouraged,
advised, and co-operated in the commission of a trespass and
hence are liable as joint tort-feasors.
"AH persons who command, instigate, encourage, advise, countenance, co-operate in, aid or abet the commission of a trespass by another are cotrespassers with the person committing trespass and are
each liable as principals to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves."

26 R. C. L. § 15, p. 766-768; Bailey V. Idaho Irrigation Co.,
39 Idaho 354, 227 P. 1055.

The plaintiffs allege that Officer Smith was actuated by
malice. The defendants allege, on the other hand, that whatever they did was done in good faith and in the exercise of
their best judgment as officers in the enforcement of the
ordinances of Logan City. There is nothing in the record
which would tend even remotely to justify the inference that
the defendants were actuated by malice or any improper
motives. The question of motive may be material in some
cases as where the conduct is of such a character as to be
qualifiedly privileged, or as involving the right to recover
punitive damages. It is not as a general rule a material element to be considered in determining whether or not a legal
right has been invaded. The absence of malice or the presence of a good motive does not render it any the less a tort.
Sidney Blumenthal & Co. V. U. S. (C. C. A.) 30 F. (2d) 247;
Lavender V. Hall, 60 Ala. 214; McCam'oll v. Stafford, 24 Ark.
224 ; Polar Wave, etc., Co. v. Alton Branch, etc., Society, 155
III. App. 310; Amick v. O'Hara, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 258;
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 87 A.
927, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 702; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass.
353, 74 N. E. 603, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep.
499, 3 Ann. Cas. 738; Hoehle V. Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa.
Super. 2 1 ; In re Grout, 88 Vt. 318, 92 A. 646, Ann. Cas.
1917A, 210; Gebhardt v. Holmes, 149 Wis. 428, 135 N. W.
860; 62 C.J. 1105.
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The judgment of the district court is reversed and the
cause remanded with instructions to grant a new trial, with
costs to appellants*
ELIAS HANSEN, C J., and FOLLAND, EPHRAIM
HANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., concur.
WOLFE, J., did not participate herein.

JOHNSON et ux. v. BRINKERHOFF et al.
N a 5640. Decided Kiy 11, 1936. (57 P. [2d] 1132.)
1 PLEADING. More liberality will be shown in permitting amendments to pleadings filed before trial than when offered during or
after trial, where parties may be taken by surprise.
2. PLEADING. Liberality sbculd be shown in allowance of amendments to pleadings for purpose of permitting complete adjudication of matters in contrcxiersy and in furtherance of justice. 1
3. PLEADING. Where origirAl complaint in action for damages for
deprivation of use of w^iar was based on contract with defendants, aUowance of ames.6*d complaint by which plaintiffs claimed
under deed from comrocz grantor held not reversible error on
ground that new cause of action was introduced where both pleadings related to same subnet-matter, same transaction, and damages for same wrong (Ear. St. 1933, 104-14-4). J
4. PLEADING. Trial court LSJ broad discretion in matter of amendments to pleadings (Rer. St. 1933, 104-14-4).*
5. WATERS AND WATER COOSZS. In action for damages for depriva-

tion of use of water in which plaintiffs relied on deed and defendants on contract, insufficiency of evidence to enable review-
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ing court to determine meaning of contract or whether contract
and deed should be considered together and failure of judgment
to dispose of all of water involved required cause to be remanded
for introduction of additional evidence.4
6. APPEAL AND ERROR. Assignment of error with respect to damages which merely stated that there was no competent evidence to
justify decree held insufficient to authorize review.8
7. ARBITRATION AND AWARD. Statute providing for arbitration of
disputes existing at time of making of arbitration agreements
held not to apply to agreements to arbitrate future disputes (Rev.
S t 1933, 104-36-1).
8. CONTRACTS. Where contract relating to water rights provided for
arbitration of future disagreements, resort to arbitration held not
condition precedent to right to maintain suit for damages for deprivation of use of water involved (Rev. St. 1933, 104-36-1).

Appeal from District Court, Fifth District, Millard County; Dilwortk Woolley, Judge.
Action by Francis W. Johnson and wife against David A.
Brinkerhoff and others, wherein John Hansen and wife filed
a cross-complaint Decree and judgment in favor of plaintiffs and cross-complainants, and named defendant appeals.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

D. N. Straup and Willard Hanson, both of Salt Lake City,
and E. Vance Wilson, of Fillmore, for appellant.
Sheen & Skeen, of Salt Lake City, for respondents Johnson,
W. B. Higgins, of Fillmore, for respondents Hansen.

iPeterson v. Union Pac. PL Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 P. (2d) 627.
^Stevens & Wallis v. GoUUx Porphyi-y Mines Co., 81 Utah 414, 18
P. (2d) 903.
*Mackay V. Breeze, 72 Ui&i 305, 269 P. 1026; Peterson v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 P. (2d) G27; Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah
203, 134 P. 885; Newton v. Trzcy Loan & Trust Co., 88 Utah 547, 40
P. (2d) 204; Gibson v. EqviizzU Life Assurance Soc, 84 Utah 452,
36 P. (2d) 105.

Sam Cline, of Milford, for respondent State Bank of
Millard County.
*Fox Film Corporation V. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 Utah 279, 17 P.
(2d) 294, 90 A. L. R. 1299; Egelund v. Fayter, 51 Utah 579, 172 P.
313, 10 R. C. L. 1065.
*Townsend V. llolbrook, 89 Utah 147, 50 P. (2d) G10.

